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Abstract. In this paper, we evaluate the performances of state-of-the-
art higher-order masking schemes for the AES. Doing so, we pay a par-
ticular attention to the comparison between specialized solutions intro-
duced exclusively as countermeasures against side-channel analysis, and
a recent proposal by Roche and Prouﬀ exploiting MultiParty Computa-
tion (MPC) techniques. We show that the additional security features
this latter scheme provides (e.g. its glitch-freeness) comes at the cost of
large performance overheads. We then study how exploiting standard op-
timization techniques from the MPC literature can be used to reduce this
gap. In particular, we show that “packed secret sharing” based on a mod-
iﬁed multiplication algorithm can speed up MPC-based masking when
the order of the masking scheme increases. Eventually, we discuss the ran-
domness requirements of masked implementations. For this purpose, we
ﬁrst show with information theoretic arguments that the security guar-
antees of masking are only preserved if this randomness is uniform, and
analyze the consequences of a deviation from this requirement. We then
conclude the paper by including the cost of randomness generation in our
performance evaluations. These results should help actual designers to
choose a masking scheme based on security and performance constraints.
1 Introduction
Masking is one of the most investigated countermeasures against side-channel
attacks. Its underlying principle is to randomize any sensitive data in a crypto-
graphic implementation, by splitting it into d shares. Intuitively, such a process is
expected to “force” the adversary to combine several leakage samples correspond-
ing to these shares, in order to recover secret information from her measurement
traces. This is an arguably more diﬃcult task than targeting single samples
separately because (1) more “points of interests” (i.e. more dimensions in the
leakage distribution) may have to be identiﬁed and exploited concurrently (e.g.
if the shares are processed sequentially), hence increasing the time complexity of
the attacks accordingly; (2) if the masking scheme is carefully implemented (e.g.
avoiding the glitch issue described in [19]), higher-order moments of this leakage
distribution will have to be estimated. It implies an increase of the attacks data
complexity that is exponential in the number of shares (with the measurement
noise variance as basis), as ﬁrst hinted towards by Chari et al. in the specialized
case of single-bit DPA attacks [3], then experimented by Standaert et al. in more
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general contexts [30], and recently shown formally by Prouﬀ and Rivain [23], us-
ing the mutual information put forward in [29] as evaluation metric.
From a theoretical point of view, the problem of masking a cryptographic
implementation has strong connections with the problem of secure MultiParty
Computation (MPC). This observation was already made in 2004 by Ishai et
al. [15], and intuitively corresponds to the fact that both masking and MPC aim
to perform computations on shared data. Their objectives are diﬀerent though,
as MPC protocols usually fulﬁll stronger security requirements (they typically
remain secure after the corruption of a number of participants, in an passive or
active manner). By contrast, masking only aims at ensuring the so-called d-th
order security property, i.e. that every d-tuple of intermediate values in the target
implementation is independent of any sensitive variable. Since the performance
overheads of masking and MPC are generally important, a natural problem is
to determine the physical security advantages of MPC over masking, as well as
its cost penalty. From the security point of view, an answer to this question has
been put forward by Roche and Prouﬀ in [25]. Namely, implementing MPC can
lead to glitch-free implementations (in a similar sense as ﬁrst described in [21]),
and allows fault-tolerance if active adversaries are considered. By contrast, their
performance evaluations were limited to asymptotic complexities so far.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate this performance gap between
masking and MPC in the practically relevant case of AES implementations in an
8-bit microcontroller. We considered three diﬀerent directions for this purpose.
First, we compared a number of existing schemes. Our selection was moti-
vated by the two following criteria: (i) exclude “broken” proposals (i.e. with
low-order weaknesses), such as the multiplicative masking in [13], the higher-
order masking in [27] (broken in [4]), or Goubin and Martinelli’s proposal in [14]
(broken in [26]); (ii) exclude schemes that do not systematically generalize to
higher-orders, such as the aﬃne masking in [10,32], the threshold implementa-
tions in [20], and several ideas from the “early” DPA literature (see [18] for a sur-
vey)1. This essentially leaves us with Rivain and Prouﬀ’s higher-order Boolean
masking scheme from CHES 2010 [24] (next denoted as RivP), its optimization
by Kim et al. using extension ﬁelds for the AES S-box implementation in [16]
(next denoted asKHL), Genelle et al.’s solution based on the switching between
additive and multiplicative masking [12] (next denoted as GPQ), and the MPC-
inspired proposal by Roche and Prouﬀ from CHES 2011 [25] (next denoted as
RocP). We implemented these diﬀerent schemes up to the 10th security order,
with results illustrating a large gap between the MPC-inspired RocP (for which
we additionally propose a slight optimization) and other masking schemes.
Motivated by this large performance gap, we then investigated a standard
solution used in the MPC literature to improve performances, namely “packed
secret sharing” [9]. In particular, we evaluate the extent to which the techniques
proposed by Damg˚ard et al. in [5] can be used to enhance the performances
of shared AES implementations, and how this performance gain depends on
1 We also excluded the recently proposed “inner product” masking scheme from [1],
although it is certainly an interesting scope for further investigation.
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the order d. Intuitively, the idea of packed secret sharing is to “hide” several
secrets (e.g. key bytes) in a high-degree polynomial, which leads to more eﬃcient
computations if operations on these secrets can be performed in parallel. We
show that such a technique is indeed useful for protecting the AES S-boxes, and
exhibit the linear amortized complexity that it allows. Yet, we also show that
this amortized complexity only becomes beneﬁcial for quite large orders.
Eventually, we tackled a usually neglected problem in the literature on mask-
ing, namely the randomness requirements. First, we brieﬂy discuss the impact of
slight defaults in the Random Number Generator (RNG) used to produce fresh
shares. In particular, we provide an information theoretic evaluation of the cases
where (i) the RNG has a small bias, and (ii) a counter was used to generate
equally likely but predictable outputs. This evaluation naturally suggests that
uniform randomness is a strong requirement for the security of masking (and
MPC). Then, we evaluated the performances of our diﬀerent masking schemes
again, including the cost of (strong-enough) randomness generation.
Overall, these result allow an implementer to decide which state-of-the-art
masking scheme to use and why, in function of his security goals (in terms of
order of the scheme and glitch-freeness), and performance constraints.
Methodology. As clear from the previous introduction, our goal is to compare
the performances of a large number of masked implementations, up to high
security orders. Relying exclusively on optimized assembly language was out of
reach in this context. As a result, we systematically took advantage of C language
descriptions, and paid a particular attention in optimizing them in such a way
that their compilation on an 8-bit device was close enough to the one of published
implementations. In particular, we used the AVR-GCC compiler (with option -
o2) to obtain codes for an Atmel AtMega644p 8-bit microcontroller. And for
each implementation published by independent authors (e.g. in [12,16,24]), we
made sure that our performances were comparable up to a factor two in clock
cycles. For this purpose, we relied on the optimization of certain routines (e.g.
for the masking of S-boxes) whenever needed. Furthermore, we systematically
wrote our codes in two fashions: one unrolled version optimized for speed and
one compact version without loop unrolling. As for optimization criteria, we
ﬁrst focused on the cycle count, and considered the 64Kb of our target device
as a memory constraint to reach. In view of the larger performance diﬀerences
that will be put forward between the investigated masking schemes and security
orders, we believe this methodology was suﬃcient to support our conclusions.
2 Comparison and Improvement of Existing Schemes
2.1 Description of Selected Schemes
In this ﬁrst section, we aim to compare AES implementations protected with
various masking schemes. For this purpose, a preliminary observation is that
the AES is composed of operations MixColumns, ShiftRows, AddRoundKey and
SubBytes. Since the Boolean and polynomial masking schemes on which we will
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focus are bytewise XOR-linear, the operations MixColumns, AddRoundKey and
ShiftRows can be executed independently on each share. As a result, we now focus
on the description of SubBytes for eﬃcient masking. This operation executes 16
nonlinear S-boxes in parallel, for which several representations exist.
For Boolean masked implementations and for the switching method GPQ we
used the standard representation, combining an inversion in GF (256) and an
aﬃne transform. This is naturally motivated by the fact that the aﬃne trans-
form is bitwise XOR-linear. In this case, the most diﬃcult operation is the in-
version, which is best achieved by exploiting secure multiplications for RivP,
as described in [24], Algorithm 1. KHL is based on similar ideas, but exploits
subﬁelds to reduce the cost of ﬁeld multiplications and the amount of random-
ness. By contrast, in the case of GPQ the switch allows moving from a Boolean
masking scheme to a multiplicative-linear one, which makes the inversion easy
and defers most the complexity to the switch operation. Algorithms 1 and 2
in [12] describe how to perform this change securely. The main challenge of this
solution is to pay attention to the masking of the zero value in the multiplicative
masking. In order to solve this issue, the authors compute the Dirac value of the
secret (which can be done eﬃciently by computing 8 such values concurrently,
as described in [11], Algorithm 4). Since these techniques are now standard in
the CHES community, we refer to the original papers for the technical details.
For the polynomial masking RocP, we note that no implementation results
have been provided so far. This solution essentially exploits core ideas from the
MPC literature. In particular, it shares the sensitive values in an implementation
using Shamir’s trick [28], and computes on these shares securely using the results
of Ben-Or, Goldwasser andWidgerson [2]. A brief summary of these techniques is
provided in Appendix A for the unfamiliar reader. In this context, an important
observation is that the scheme is not bitwise XOR-linear. As a result, the best
S-box representation is in polynomial form, namely 0x63+ 0x5 x−1 + 0x9 x−2 +
0xf9 x−4 + 0x25 x−8 + 0xf4 x−16 + x−32 + 0xb5 x−64 + 0x8f x−128. Again, the
most diﬃcult part of this S-box is the inversion, which can be implemented using
4 multiplications and some squarings. Roche and Prouﬀ describe a polynomial
multiplication in [25], Algorithm 1. Since the focus of their work was on glitch-
freeness, they proposed to use a (2d+ 1, d)-sharing for all operations, including
linear ones (which allows separating the implementation in several independent
sub-circuits). In the following, we suggest a slight modiﬁcation of this proposal
which essentially extends a (d+1, d)-sharing to a (2d+1, d)-sharing in a glitch-
free manner (as described in Algorithm 1). This tweak will be denoted asRocP.
It allows us to perform the linear operations with a lower degree sharing, and to
divide by 2 the cost of these operations in our masked implementations.
In this algorithm, we use m ∈R GF (256) to mean that m is uniformly randomly
chosen in GF (256). The coeﬃcients λji =
∏
0≤k≤d
xj ⊕ xk
xi ⊕ xk (with k = i) are the
evaluations in xj of the Lagrangian of the (d + 1, d)-sharing. Since the points
xi’s are chosen before the execution of the masked implementation, these λ
j
i
can be precomputed. Interestingly, the diﬀerent shares are always used one at a
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Algorithm 1. Expanding of a sharing
Require: A (d+ 1, d)-sharing (xi, yi)
d+1
i=1 .
Ensure: A (2d+ 1, d)-sharing (xi, ti)
2d+1
i=1 .
1: for j from 1 to d+ 1 do
2: tj = yj
3: end for
4: for j from d+ 2 to 2d+ 1 do
5: for i from 1 to d+ 1 do
6: mji ∈R GF (256)
7: tmpji = yi ⊗ λji
8: tmpji = tmp
j
i ⊕mji
9: end for
10: tj = 0
11: for i from 1 to d+ 1 do
12: tj = tj ⊕ tmpji
13: end for
14: for i from 1 to d+ 1 do
15: tj = yj ⊕mji
16: end for
17: end for
18: return (xi, ti)
2d+1
i=1
time in Algorithm 1. Hence, just as in RocP, no glitches can leak information on
several shares and the implementation of this algorithm can be based on separate
sub-circuits. Namely, a ﬁrst class of sub-circuits calculates the masked values and
sends the information at the right time; a second class of sub-circuits combines
the information to obtain new shares. Note ﬁnally that our implementation did
not take advantage of the DFT technique proposed in [26] since for the security
degrees we considered, it did not lead to signiﬁcant performance gains2.
2.2 Implementation Result
We now compare the performances of the selected schemes, considering both
unrolled and compact implementations. As previously mentioned, the use of un-
rolled codes allows reducing the execution time at the cost of increased code size.
Hence, it is limited to lower security orders in our target devices. Figure 4(a)
2 For example, to evaluate a polynomial of degree 16 in 16 points, our basic method
requires 256 multiplications and 256 XOR’s. For the same evaluation with the DFT
solution, we have to reduce a 16-degree polynomial by a 16-degree polynomial, which
requires 17 multiplications, 16 XOR’s, and 1 inversion. Then two reductions of a 15-
degree polynomial by an 8-degree polynomial have to be performed, each of them
requiring 72 multiplications, 64 XOR’s and 1 inversion. Eventually, the DFT tech-
nique corresponds to 321 multiplications, 256 XOR’s and 15 inversions in this case.
Since the maximum degree we will consider in our experiments is 12, and DFT-based
evaluations work best with powers of 2, we believe it will not lead to signiﬁcant im-
provements and focus on other possible optimizations in the next section.
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contains the execution times of the masked AES implementation in unrolled
version (up to security order 7). Figure 4(b) exhibits similar results in the com-
pact implementation case (up to security order 10). As can be observed, this
programming style has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the cycle counts.
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Fig. 1. Cycle counts for masked AES implementations: unrolled codes (a) and compact
codes (b). The curves are for KHL, the curves are for RocP, the curves
are for RivP, the curves are for RocP, and the curves are for GPQ.
These ﬁrst ﬁgures clearly illustrates the signiﬁcant performance gap between
“standard” masking schemes and the MPC-based solution RocP. We also ob-
serve that our tweak forRocP leads to interesting gains, in particular in the case
of unrolled codes (indeed, step 4 in Algorithm 1 can be performed with a single
table access in this case). Eventually, the switching method GPQ provides the
most eﬃcient implementations, which connects with previously published results
and the intuition that the AES is particularly well suited to this solution, since
it alternates XOR-linear parts and multiplications. As for Boolean masking, the
advantage of the subﬁeld representation in KHL is also observed.
3 More Eﬃcient MPC with Packed Secret Sharing
The previous section suggests that the polynomial masking scheme RocP suf-
fers from signiﬁcant performance overheads compared to GPQ or RivP-KHL.
Hence, despite its interesting security features (e.g. in terms of glitch-freeness, or
ability to prevent fault attacks), the gap between the security orders that can be
reached with one or the other type of masking clearly beneﬁts to the simplest so-
lutions. Yet, the proposal by Roche and Prouﬀ was mainly based on early results
in the MPC literature. As a result, this section investigates whether some more
recent optimizations could be exploited to improve the performances of MPC-
based masking. In particular, we evaluate the opportunities to take advantage of
packed secret sharing. The main idea of this technique is to hide several secrets in
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a higher-degree polynomial, by using several initial conditions (see Appendix A).
The opening is then performed by evaluating the polynomials in the locations
used by the dealer. In general, such a solution is useful when there is exploitable
parallelism in the algorithm to execute. In the following, we will focus on the
parallelism available in the execution of the SubBytes transform.
3.1 Description of the Packed Secret Sharing Techniques
Intuition. The packed secret sharing technique essentially consists in hiding
several secrets in the same polynomial, in order to amortize the cost of computing
a function over several masked secrets in parallel. Let t be the number of secrets
(e.g. corresponding to the number of S-boxes to execute in our AES case), and
d the threshold number (i.e. the security order of the masking scheme). Suppose
that a single masked S-box has cost of O(d2) basic ﬁeld operations (and assuming
that all constants hidden by the O notation are small). A naive way to execute the
t S-Boxes in parallel would require cost of O(td2). By exploiting the properties
of the packed secret sharing, this can be reduced to O(t + d)2. As a result, for
a ﬁxed d and in a setting where t  d operations are executed in parallel, the
complexity of the protected evaluation is increased asymptotically only by a
linear factor compared to an unprotected evaluation. Notice however that this
improvement in complexity is only achieved for circuits of reasonable size.
How to Multiply. Using packed sharing prevents to use secure multiplications
based on Ben-Or et al. [2]. Indeed, to reduce the degree of the polynomial their
solution is to erase all the large monomials. This can be done if the secret is
located in 0 (since the elimination of large monomials does not change the secret
in this case). But packed secret sharing needs several locations for the secrets,
which implies that the truncation of polynomials becomes diﬃcult to realize,
as best illustrated with the following example. Let s1 (resp. s2) be a secret
shared by a polynomial P1(X) (resp. P2(X)). sl = Pl(0) =
∑
i
t
(l)
i
∏
j =i
xi
xj − xi , for
l =1 or 2 . Remark that we can write Pl(X) =
∑
0≤i≤d
a
(l)
i X
i. Ben-Or et al. et al.
calculate s1s2 by performing the product Q(X) = P1(X)P2(X). The polynomial
Q(X) has a degree 2d, but since the secret is located in 0, it can be truncated
by securely erasing all monomials larger than d. Note that this secure erasure
process requires to combine diﬀerent shares. Hence the information exchanged
in this step needs to be masked in order to maintain the security order. Let this
truncated polynomial be denoted as Q|d(X). Then we have Q(0) = Q|d(0). All
other evaluations can be aﬀected by the erasure of the largest monomials.
A natural solution to avoid this problem is to rely on a diﬀerent multiplication
algorithm. For example, we can use the proposal by Damg˚ard et al. [5], described
in Algorithm 2. In brief, this multiplication masks the result with a random
polynomial, opens the result and ﬁnally removes the random polynomial, for a
complexity in O(d2). More precisely, let n = d+ t and Open / Share refer to the
operations that allow recovering several shared secrets and to distribute them
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Algorithm 2. Polynomial opening multiplication
Require: A (n, d)-sharing of y and z : (xi, yi)
n
i=1 and (xi, zi)
n
i=1.
Ensure: A (n, d)-sharing of y × z : (xi, ti)ni=1 .
1: for i from 1 to n do
2: ri ∈R GF (256)
3: end for
4: Use Alg. 1 on (xi, ri)
n
i=1,(xi, yi)
n
i=1 and (xi, zi)
n
i=1
5: for i from 1 to 2n− 1 do
6: pi = yi ⊗ zi ⊕ ri
7: end for
8: (s1, . . . , st) = Open((x1, p1), . . . , (x2n−1, p2n−1))
9: (t1, . . . , tn) = Share(s1, . . . , st)
10: for i from 1 to n do
11: ti = ti ⊕ ri
12: end for
13: return (xi, yi)
n
i=1
among participants (as explained in Appendix A). The ﬁrst step in Algorithm 2 is
the same as in Ben-or et al, i.e. we simply calculate Q(X) = P1(X)P2(X). Then
the reduction step is diﬀerent. The polynomial Q(X) is masked by a random
polynomial R(X), which is done by adding the shares ri’s in step 6. Afterwards,
the polynomial Q + R(X) is evaluated in the positions where the secrets are
located. Let {vk}nk=1 be the set of the locations for the diﬀerent secrets. Remark
that to determine R(vk), one has to estimate n points of R(X), which allows
maintaining the d-th order security. Eventually, the k secrets are shared in a new
polynomial Q′(X) (in step 9), that is of degree n and corresponds to a sharing of
Q+R(vk). Hence, it just remains to remove the random polynomial to obtain a
sharing of Q(vk) of degree at most n, which is done in step 11 of the algorithm.
Squaring Issues. The problem of moving the position of shares between par-
ticipants when squaring (described in Appendix A) also becomes more critical
when exploiting packed secret sharing. That is, we now have to face the fact that
multiple secrets are hidden in several positions, which can also move. Since the
secrets need to be located at the same position to be combined, we cannot use
a stable set of secrets like proposed for sharing in [25]. As a result, we avoid the
squaring problem directly by implementing them with secure multiplications.
One consequence of this choice is that it is also interesting to use a modiﬁed
addition chain for the inversion, in order to minimize both the number of mul-
tiplications and squarings. We used the one described in [6] for this purpose,
which requires 11 secure multiplications (including the squarings).
Full AES. We face one more problem when extending the packing towards the
full AES. Namely the operationsMixColumns and ShiftRows need to move secrets
that are hidden in the same polynomial. Hence, and in order to beneﬁt both from
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the performance gains of packed secret sharing during the execution of the S-
boxes and from the linear parts, we decided to switch to single secret polynomials
after each execution of SubBytes. To switch from t polynomials of degree d+ 1
(with secrets located in position 0) to a single polynomial of degree d+ t (with
secrets located at positions vk), we ﬁrst move the positions of all the secrets
from 0 to vk (secret per secret). Next, we multiply the resulting polynomial by
another polynomial, that cancels at positions vj =k and equals 1 in vk. Eventually,
we add all polynomials together to obtain a single polynomial of degree d+t and
containing t secrets. For the inverse operation (i.e. moving from one polynomial
to t polynomials), we ﬁrst move each secret from position vk to position 0. Then
we erase all monomials of high degree in order to keep a polynomial of degree
d. Eventually, we refresh the masking by adding a polynomial sharing of zero.
These two operations are detailed in Appendix B, Algorithms 3 and 4.
3.2 Implementation Result
We now compareRocP, with a MPC-inspired masking exploiting Algorithm 2,
for various amounts of secrets hidden per polynomial. In order to evaluate the
extent to which the packed secret sharing is exclusively useful for the execution
of the AES S-boxes or if the switching between single-secret polynomials and
packed secret polynomials is an eﬃcient solution, we provide performance results
both for 16 inversions and for the full AES. Besides, and in order to reﬂect the
impact of high security orders, we focused on the compact versions of our codes
(the impact of unrolling is very similar to the one in the previous section).
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Fig. 2. Cycle counts for MPC-based masking (compact codes): 16 inversions (a) and
full AES (b). The curves are for RocP, the packed secret sharing curves are
represented by , , and for respectively 2, 4, 8 and 16 secrets. The curves
are for the multiplication of Algorithm 2 with a single secret per polynomial.
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The results in Figure 2 ﬁrst exhibit that a change of multiplication algorithm
is anyway beneﬁcial to performances in our implementation context. In particu-
lar, it is interesting to notice that the diﬀerent asymptotic complexities for the
multiplication inRocP (cubic in the security order) and the one of Algorithm 2
(quadratic in the security order) are nicely reﬂected in the plots. The impact of
packed secret sharing is also put forward. In particular, we can observe the (ex-
pected) quasi-linear complexity of these schemes. Interestingly, the results for
the 16 inversions and for the full AES do not strongly deviate, hence suggesting
that the iterated execution of Algorithms 3 and 4 does not harm performances
to the point where it would become useless. Eventually, the security orders for
which the quasi-linear complexity of packed secret sharing materializes remain
quite high (d = 10 for the full AES), hence suggesting that hiding a single secret
per polynomial remains the best approach in most practical settings.
4 Randomness Requirements and Impact on
Performances
Before to conclude, we would like to brieﬂy investigate the issue of random num-
ber generation that is usually neglected in the evaluation of masking schemes.
This is an important issue since the amount of randomness required to mask
each non-linear operation within the AES while maintaining a security of order
d is again quadratic in d. For this purpose, we will start by providing some infor-
mation theoretic intuition regarding why strong randomness is indeed needed.
In particular, we will show that this randomness has to be uniform, and that
diﬀerent deviations from this requirement imply weaknesses appearing for low
and high measurement noise levels, respectively. Then, we will re-evaluate the
performances of the best masking schemes we analyzed in this paper, considering
a realistic performance penalty for the generation of each random byte.
4.1 How Good Must the Randomness Be?
In order to answer this question, we ﬁrst repeated exactly the information the-
oretic analysis described in [29] and applied to the masking countermeasure
in [30]. It leads to the information theoretic curves for the unprotected S-box
and the 1st-order masked one in Figure 3. As detailed in these previous works,
such information theoretic curves provide an evaluation of the worst-case secu-
rity level of a countermeasure (i.e. the security level in front of an adversary
with a perfect knowledge of the leakage distribution). In the case of masking,
the order of the countermeasure is reﬂected in the slope of the curve (i.e. one
for the unprotected S-box, 2 for the 1st-order masked one). We then considered
two additional scenarios where the randomness was not as perfect as expected.
In the ﬁrst place, we considered the random number to be predictable. In
particular, we took the simple case where the 16 S-boxes were masked with a
counter. In this context, an observation already made in [31] in the context of
the shuﬄing countermeasure is that an adversary will be able to target the 16
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Fig. 3. Information theoretic evaluation of masking schemes
masks jointly. That is, since there are only 256 possible start values, she can
evaluate the likelihood of the 256 sequences of 16 mask leakages, and use them
in her template attack. Just as for the case of shuﬄing, the impact of such an
imperfection of the randomness is that for low noise levels, all the masks will be
recovered with probability one, as illustrated in Figure 3. As a complement, we
also considered the case where the randomness was slightly biased in the same
ﬁgure. Interestingly, it is well known that such biases directly create a lower-order
weakness (e.g. like the “zero problem” in multiplicative masking [13]). But in
fact, depending on the strength of the bias, this ﬁrst-order weakness may or not
be the best way to attack. That is, as illustrated in the ﬁgure, a small ﬁrst-order
weakness will only dominate at the noise level for which its bias is signiﬁcant in
front of the second-order information that is anyway available. The combination
of these observations naturally suggests that both for low and high noise levels,
exploiting biased or predictable randomness is not an option for masking.
4.2 Implementation Result
Since strong randomness is anyway required for masking to lead to its expected
security improvements, we ﬁnally repeated our performance evaluations assum-
ing a reasonable cost for producing each random byte. Namely, we considered 10
cycles for each of these generations (excluding the memory accesses), which cor-
responds both to the typical quantity that we found for security chips of the same
manufacturer as our target device, and to the execution of two AES rounds for
producing 16 bytes of pseudorandomness. Besides, and in order to optimize the
randomness requirements, we also modiﬁed the addition chain for the inversion
in order to minimize this additional criteria, as proposed in [6]. We then com-
pared the schemes of Section 2 again, namely RivP, KHL, GPQ and RocP,
as well as the MPC-based scheme using the multiplication of Algorithm 2 us-
ing a single secret per polynomial, and the best packed sharing scheme from
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the previous section (i.e. the most eﬃcient solution for each security degree),
considering compact codes. As illustrated in Figure 4, the cost of the random
generation shifts the performance curves. But since all algorithms have a cost in
randomness that is quadratic in the order of the masking scheme, this shift does
not contradict the previous observations. One can just observe that the order for
which packed secret sharing becomes a useful alternative is delayed by one. For
the rest, the gap between RivP, KHL, GPQ and MPC-based masking remains
large, but has been signiﬁcantly reduced thanks to our optimizations.
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Fig. 4. Cycle counts for masked AES implementations with time to generate random.
The curve is for KHL, the curve is for RocP, the curve is for RivP,
the curve is for GPQ, the curve is for the multiplication of Algorithm 2 with
a single secret per polynomial and the curve is for the best packed secret sharing.
5 Conclusions
The choice of a masking scheme to protect AES implementations is a delicate
tradeoﬀ between security and performances. In this paper, we provided a careful
comparison of diﬀerent state-of-the-art proposals for this purpose, together with
a cautionary note regaring the importance of relying on strong randomness in this
context. We hope that it will help actual designers in choosing the solution that
best ﬁts their security and performance constraints. Interestingly, and despite the
intuitive connection between these problems, our results show that specialized
masking schemes that only guarantee higher-order side-channel security have
signiﬁcantly better performances than general MPC-inspired solutions. Yet, the
latter ones provide interesting security features, e.g. the glitch-freeness previously
discussed by Roche and Prouﬀ, or the ability to prevent fault attacks (i.e. to resist
active adversaries). Quite naturally, MPC also beneﬁts from a huge literature,
and more optimization eﬀorts could certainly be considered to further reduce the
gap between these two problems. The use of somewhat homomorphic encryption
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taking advantage of a preprocessing phase to reduce asymptotic complexities can
be mentioned as an example [8], in particular since it has been shown to provide
eﬃcient implementations of the AES [7]. Also, the parallelism we exploit in this
work was internal to the AES (i.e. based on its 16 S-boxes). This is natural since
embedded applications usually encrypt only a small amount of plaintexts. But
in other scenarios where many plaintexts have to be encrypted concurrently, it
would be possible to take advantage of this additional (extrernal) parallelism.
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A Shamir’s Secret Sharing and BGW
The idea of sharing a secret between several persons is a problem proposed by Liu
in 1968 [17]. 11 years after, Shamir described a way to solve it [28]. His solution
essentially exploits the fact that Lagrangian interpolation allows to recover the
polynomial of lowest degree passing through several points. As a result, to share
a secret s the person who knows the secret (usually referred to as the dealer)
chooses a random polynomial P , such that P (0) = s (usually referred to as
the initial condition). Let d be the degree of P . Then the dealer distributes the
evaluations of P at diﬀerent points (called the shares) to the e participants,
and labels the i-th evaluation in xi = 0 with yi. This step is usually called the
sharing. In this paper we will denote this operation by (y1, . . . , ye) = Share(s).
Now if f > d participants want to discover the secret, they use the interpolation
method to ﬁnd P , and then evaluate P in 0: this step is called the opening. In
this paper we will denote this operation by s = Open(y1, . . . , yf ). By contrast
if f ≤ d, then P cannot be recovered since not enough information is available.
In practice, the interpolation can be done using the Lagrangian method. In that
case, the participants build Q(X) =
∑
0≤i≤f
yi
∏
j =i
X − xi
xj − xi . Since this polynomial
has degree at most f and veriﬁes Q(xi) = yi ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , f}, we directly have
that if f > d, then Q = P according to the fundamental theorem of algebra.
The original MPC techniques in [2] essentially aim at computing on secrets
shared according to Shamir’s trick. In this context, it is easy to see that the
addition of two secrets can be done directly, by simply performing the addition on
each pair of shares. By contrast, multiplying two shared secrets is more diﬃcult,
since the multiplication of two polynomials of degree d in a ﬁeld gives rise to
a polynomial of degree 2d. As a result, and in order for the degrees of the
polynomials to remain low enough so that MPC remains eﬃcient, it is necessary
to reduce this polynomial securely. The solution proposed by Ben-Or, Goldwasser
and Wigderson is to use sharings with t > 2d, perform the multiplications locally,
and then securely delete in all the monomials of degree higher than d [2].
Note that when using polynomial masking (e.g. based on Shamir’s secret
sharing), the square function is also a bit more diﬃcult to implement than in
the Boolean case. Indeed, let s = P (0) =
∑
ti
∏
j =i
xi
xj − xi . To calculate the square
of s, the participants have to compute s2 =
∑
y2i
∏
j =i
x2i
x2j − x2i
. But without special
care, this operation moves the position of the shares between participants (while
the execution of linear operations can only be performed if the shares are located
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at the same place). In [25], the authors propose to use a set S of location points
that are stable by Frobenius application to avoid this problem. That is, for our
case we select points such that x2 = y and then let the participants exchange
shares (which is possible in the context of masking where all participants are on
the same chip and assumed to be honest - but not in the general MPC case).
B Switch Packed Secret Single Secret
We describe how to switch from a single polynomial masking to a packed se-
cret sharing (and vice versa) in Algorithms 3 and 4. Note that step 5 in Al-
gorithm 1 allows to obtain a (n, d)-sharing from a (d + 1, d)-sharing. Aki is the
evaluation on xi of the polynomial Ak(X) =
∏
i=k
X−vi
vk−vi . It easy to check that
this polynomial veriﬁes the condition of annihilation in vi for i = k. Eventu-
ally, mki =
∏
j =i
xj
vk−xj allows to move the location of a secret from 0 to vk, since
mki =
∏
j =i
xj
xi−xf (
∏
j =i
vk−xj
xi−xj )
−1. As a result, the reconstruction with
∏
j =i
vk−xj
xi−xj will
give the same secret as the evaluation in zero of the original polynomial. Simi-
larly, dki =
∏
j =i
vk−xj
xj
allows to move the location of the secret for vk to zero.
Algorithm 3. Switch from t single-secret polys to 1 packed secret poly
Require: t (d+ 1, d)-sharings of sk : (xi, y
k
i )
d+1
i=1 .
Ensure: A (n, d)-sharing of {sk}tk=1 : (xi, ti)ni=1.
1: for k from 1 to t do
2: for i from 1 to d do
3: yki = y
k
i ⊗mki
4: end for
5: Use a modiﬁed Alg. 1 on (xi, y
k
i )
d+1
i=1
6: for i from 1 to d do
7: yki = y
k
i ⊗ Aki
8: end for
9: end for
10: for k from 1 to t do
11: for i from 1 to t+ d do
12: ti = ti ⊕ yki
13: end for
14: end for
15: return (xi, ti)
n
i=1
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Algorithm 4. Switch from 1 packed secret poly to t single-secret polys
Require: A (n, d)-sharing of {sk}tk=1 : (xi, ti)ni=1.
Ensure: t (d+ 1, d)-sharings of sk : {(xi, yki )d+1i=1 }tk=1.
1: for i from 1 to t do
2: for k from 1 to d+ t do
3: yki = ti ⊗ dki
4: end for
5: for i from 1 to d do
6: ri ∈R GF (256)
7: end for
8: Use Alg. 1 on (xi, ri)
d+1
i=1
9: for i from 1 to d+ t do
10: yki = y
k
i ⊕ ri
11: end for
12: res = Open((x0, y
k
0 ), . . . , (xt+d, y
k
t+d)
13: (t1, . . . , td+1) = Share(0)
14: for k from 1 to d+ 1 do
15: yki = ri ⊕ res⊕ ti
16: end for
17: end for
18: return {(xi, yki )d+1i=1 }tk=1
